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Abstract:  In recent years, technology
of processors and smaller in size. This
to be merged to form a circuit called
tween SoC and microcontrollers, microprocessors
single chip, doing all the things the
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1. Introduction 
Briefly, an SoC is an integrated circuit(IC)
ranging integration of various components
ory controllers, intellectual properties(IP)
for specialised uses (Davis, 2012)(Wang
the chips and its parts will shrink further
(Davis, 2012). 
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Figure 2.  Growth of IoT (NCTA, 2015)
Because IoT systems are a network
becomes complex and challenging.
security of this ecosystem. Security
data transmitted in the network between
to secrets of an organisation (Kumar
 started to require less power and space. It also
 circuits on the chip, and further reliability (Palomar
 was inevitable that many systems started to use SoC,
 get complicated, so do the systems’ operations
 naturally depend on the signals of the components
this system, namely microcontrollers and SoCs. In a case
 they may create single-point of failures if not protected
 and SoCs are interconnected, they also expose vulnerability
 to be protected against possible cyber attacks. 
 of IoT is growing exponentially (as seen on Figure 2),
 and more crucial with the same rate (Maglaras et al,
 has not yet been perceived and its application
 and more (Nolan, n.d.). In order to provide the highest
 are thought to have a single SoC (Nolan, n.d.). 
 
 of many connected devices, the process of securing 
 There can be malicious hardware or software which
 issues of IoT systems are to be handled with even more
 the nodes may be sensitive, ranging from personal
 et al, 2017). 
 grants higher perfor-
 Technologies, n.d.). 
 though some contin-
 and structures. The 
 and calculations 
 that these compo-
 and handled 
 risks in the 
 the need for protec-
 2018). The full range 
 range includes infra-
 level of integra-
the whole system also 
 may compromise the 
 care because the 
 and private data 
` 
 
To implement the system in a secure way, the organisations have to consider potential adversaries. It is de-
scribed to be a very creative process by (Ray and Jin, 2015) because the team has to think of every possible 
scenario and considerations of immoral actions and leakages. The following adversary examples are self-
explanatory hence only their titles are mentioned.  
 
— Unprivileged Software Adversary, System Software Adversary, Software Covert Channel Adversary (when a 
side-channel or covert-channel has access to non-functional characteristics of the system) (Ray and Jin, 2015) 
 
— Naive Hardware Adversary (when attackers manage to get into hardware devices), Hardware Reverse-
Engineering Adversary, Malicious Hardware Intrusion Adversary (Ray and Jin, 2015) 
 
3. Hardware Security of SoC 
As a consequence of the rapid growth of IoT (NCTA, 2015)(Evans, 2011), many edge devices have to be given 
access to a large number of security assets which are to be protected from unauthorised or malicious access 
(Nath et al, 2018). The edge nodes are the devices which gather data from sensors and interact with physical 
objects in the ecosystem (Kumar et al, 2017). 
 
SoC design consists of interactive firmware and hardware. In order to verify the security of these modules, a 
method called instruction-level abstraction (ILA) is used, which addresses verification of properties across 
firmware and hardware by “Raising the level of abstraction of hardware modules to be similar to that of in-
structions in firmware” (Malik and Subramanyan, 2016). Hence, this technique helps to ensure that hardware 
implementations and the firmware of the chip do not contradict with each other. Moreover, there is hardware 
support for security called Trusted Execution Environment (TEE)  for microcontrollers and SoCs used in sensi-
tive applications (Kumar et al, 2017). 
 
Security operations such as encryption-decryption and access blocking are handled at the hardware level (Ni-
chols, 2019). In order to raise security of a chip, cryptography is used. There are two crypto systems, symme-
tric and asymmetric (Elkeelany and Olabisi, 2006).  Symmetric (Schubert and Anheier, 1999) systems use only 
one key to encrypt and decrypt messages. Asymmetric systems on the other hand, use two that are called 
public and private keys.They use the public key to encrypt and the private key to decrypt messages (Elkeelany 
and Olabisi, 2006). 
 
Hitherto, patching has been used only on the software (or firmware) side of the system, in order to strengthen 
or to cover a discovered security hole. “Hardware patching” means hardware implementation of security re-
quirements that permit seamless post-silicon adaptation (Nath et al., 2018). Recently, it is firmly suggested 
that also the hardware should be patchable on devices which are to become part of the IoT (Ray et al, 2017). 
The reason given for this is because soon it will not be possible to fix every single security vulnerability only by 
altering the software (Ray et al, 2017). In addition to that, implementing a functionality in hardware reduces 
the energy consumption greatly which is an immense advantage (Ray et al, 2017). Secure hardware systems 
demand a very high level of verification due to the fact that “patching” is not an option (Bartley, 2017). This 
can indicate that when patching is made available, enforcements to verify hardware systems may be reduced. 
 
In order to increase patchability of the system, Nath et al.2018, introduces a new framework with a centralised 
Reconfigurable Security Policy Engine (RSPE), smart security wrappers, and Design-for-Debug (DFD) infrastruc-
ture interface.  Design-for-test (DFT) infrastructure is used to tackle hardware trojan problems with minimum 
hardware insertion into SoCs (Backer et al, 2014). The DFT infrastructure enables SoC integrators to gain 
access and have control over IP hardware during post-silicon testing, and after the testing, the DFT infrastruc-
ture remains unused (Backer et al, 2014).  
 
The integration of these chips involves connecting third party IP blocks along with DFT hardware pieces, and 
verification and validation processes of the overall system design (Saleh et al, 2006). These third party hard-
ware IP may be acquired from untrusted vendors and in that case they may have a different level of integrity 
and security issues (Ray et al, 2018)(Gundabolu and Wang, 2018). These third party vendors may compromise 
the integrity and security of an SoC design by inserting malicious hardware trojans in their IP (Ray et al, 2018), 
so the risk of the built-in hardware trojans emerges (Ray et al, 2018)(Li et al, 2016). Unlike software trojans, 
hardware trojans cannot simply be removed and these trojans may hinder fundamental functionalities of the 
hardware (Kim and Villasenor, 2015)(Jin and Phatak, 2015). The detection of these trojans occurs by going 
through post-deployment functional verifications (Jin and Phatak, 2015). 
` 
 
Functional Verification Examples 
Property Specification Language (PSL) Assertions: They are used to aid verification of complex systems and 
they may be used to monitor various signals for legal and illegal transitions (Montador, n.d.). 
 
Transaction based testbench-simulations: Traditional behavioural testbenches may become bulky when it 
comes to testing complex systems (Montador, n.d.) (e.g. going through all the states of a system would be 
burdensome and cost too much time).  
 
Verification IP: It is used to ensure IP interoperability and system behaviour (Mentor, n.d.). They can also sup-
port rapid testbench development (Sondrel, 2016). Usage of IP in a testbench may include functionalities such 
as keeping track of the traffic between interfaces, and reporting on any violations with respect to existing 
standards or specifications (Mantador, n.d.).  
 
Trace-Based Debugging: This technique allows SoC integrators to monitor internal signals of IP cores embed-
ded in the SoC (Backer et al, 2016). Its uniqueness is that there is no need to stop the execution in order to 
capture the values of the signals (Backer et al, 2016). 
 
These are only a few examples of how a hardware can be verified. If we are to talk about standards, the Uni-
versal Verification Methodology (ACCELLERA, 2009) is widely used for integrated circuits. 
 
4. Software Security Architecture 
Naturally, protecting a chip from hardware faults and producing them without bugs and malfunctions is not 
solely enough. The SoC has to be protected also from possible threats coming from faulty firmware or the OS 
kernel and applications (Ray and Jin, 2015). 
 
Simple software designs are commonly used in most security systems because when the system is simple, 
there is a lower risk of bugs which are a security vulnerability (ARM, 2009). Because multi-threading introduces 
another layer of software complexity -which is also very hard to test due to timing sensitivity-, many Secure 
world software implementations may choose to implement single-processor (ARM, 2009). Secure world, also 
known as TrustZone and Trusted Execution Environment, is a sand-boxed execution environment that has 
higher privileges than the normal kernel (Vita Development Wiki, n.d.).  
 
Unauthorised access to sensitive assets proposes a critical issue to SoC designs. And modern SoC designs con-
tain numerous assets of this type which must be secure against unauthorised access (Ray and Jin, 2015). The 
authentication mechanisms that protect these assets are governed by security policies which are also referred 
to as security architectures in an SoC design (Ray and Jin, 2015). 
 
In order to make justified design choices concerning what and how much to protect, the threats must be well 
defined in the scope of their risks and the definition of security for that system (ARM, 2009). 
 
In order to protect the system from malicious software, there are some policies introduced as follows:  
 
Access Control: This policy defines which “agent” has access to which asset at different points of the system 
execution (Ray and Jin, 2015)(Goguen and Meseguer, 1982). 
 
Information Flow: This technique attempts to analyse all the possible interactions and interferences (Goguen 
and Meseguer, 1982). Naturally, this policy is implemented along with access control policies and even with 
additional constraints if necessary (Ray and Jin, 2015).  (An agent can be a hardware or a software component 
of an IP) 
 
Liveness: To meet availability requirements, the system has to perform without any pause or “stagnation” 
throughout its execution which also prevents getting the system caught in deadlocks or livelocks (Basak, 2015). 
This policy is meant to ensure protection against denial-of-service attacks (Ray and Jin, 2015).  
 
Time of Check vs. Time of Use (TOCTOU): the security objective of an SoC has to be that at any time, the de-
vice may only run authenticated firmware(Krstic et al, 2014). In other words, any agent that wants to gain 
access to a resource has to be authenticated (Basak, 2015) and it is ensured that the authenticated agent is 
really accessing the resource (Ray and Jin, 2015). 
 
` 
Message Immutability: Messages sent between components have to be exactly how they are expected to be 
(Ray and Jin, 2015). 
 
Redirection and Masquerade Prevention: A message sent from a component to another cannot be delivered 
to any other component which masquerades itself as the destination component, or the message cannot be 
duplicated and sent to another component (Ray and Jin, 2015). 
 
Non-Observability: A private message between two components should never be accessible by another IP 
during its travel (Ray and Jin, 2015). 
 
Furthermore, besides those policies, there are several characteristics introduced within (Ray and Jin, 2015) 
such as: Boot Confidentiality which instructs that no IP may access internal registers during boot, Firmware 
Integrity, that any firmware running on an IP has to be signed or authenticated beforehand which is closely 
related to the TOCTOU policy. 
 
5. Weaknesses / Vulnerabilities 
As mentioned earlier, the IoT is drawing much attention and it is becoming highly prevalently used by numer-
ous companies all around the world. There are already projects such as cloud based smart cities and perhaps 
in a few decades these projects will be live. Yet even now there are known failures of some IoT systems. Sev-
eral of them, which are not deliberate violations, are listed below. 
 
— The vulnerability, or more like a leakage, of emergency broadcast systems produced by Acoustic Technology 
Inc. (ATI) was found by Bastille Security that command packet broadcasts could be captured over the air, even 
modified and replayed (Sanders, 2018).   
— Belkin WeMo, included digital keys in their firmware and the leakage of these keys was a great weakness for 
hackers to be able to take control of lights and home appliances (Heideman, 2016)(Goodin, 2014).  
— Wink sold hubs that could connect to IoT devices. When the installed security certificate expired the whole 
IoT system malfunctioned/stopped working (Heideman, 2016), or as described in (Barrett, 2015), lobotomised.  
 
These and many more IoT system failures are attributed to the lack of experience and expertise according to 
Cisco's Australian CTO Kevin Bloch as he mentioned in an interview (Reichert, 2017). It is credibly true for the 
technical part of failures of IoT systems, when the system is developed by using appropriate designs, standards 
and policies. But besides the technicality of a project, it should not be forgotten that the organisation itself 
plays a big role for a project which also affects communications in teams. Of course communication may be 
considered at an individual level but the culture inside an organisation has a very important impact on it. 
Thirdly, available tools may have diverse influences such as the familiarity of the team members about particu-
lar tools.    
 
6. Novelty 
There are numerous publications which discuss many aspects of chips’ software and hardware security as refe-
renced throughout the paper. Yet all of these references look at only singular and specific aspect of security. 
The purpose of this publication is to summarise how securing a chip is approached on both software and 
hardware during the whole process of making the chip and maintaining it in the course of its lifetime.  
References Year Title Hardware/Software-
Firmware 
Specification 
Kumar, S. 
et al 2017 
Security Enhancements to System on 
Chip Devices for IoT Perception Layer Both 
Cursory solutions and 
no verifications / 
focus on IoT devices  
Malik, S. 
et al 2016 
Specification and Modeling for Sys-
tems-on-Chip Security Verification Hardware 
Hardware Security 
Verification 
` 
References Year Title Hardware/Software-
Firmware 
Specification 
Ray, S. 
et al 2017 
To Secure the Internet of Things, We 
Must Build It Out of “Patcha-
ble” Hardware 
Hardware Hardware Patchabili-ty 
Nath, A. 
et al 2018 
System-on-Chip Security Architecture 
and CAD Framework for Hardware 
Patch 
Hardware Hardware Patchabili-ty 
Kim, L. 
et al 2015 
 Dynamic Function Verification for 
System on Chip Security Against 
Hardware-Based Attacks 
Hardware Hardware Attacks 
Bartley, M. 2017 Hardware Security Challenges and Solutions Hardware Hardware Protection 
Jin, Y. 
et al 2015 Introduction to Hardware Security Hardware Hardware Protection 
Schubert, A. 
et al 1999 
Efficient VLSI Implementation of 
Modern Symmetric Block Ciphers Both Ciphering data 
Montador, 
A. n.d. 
Verification Methodology for Stan-
dards-based IP & SOC Hardware 
Hardware Verifica-
tion 
Sondrel 2016 Functional Verification Techniques for your SoC Design Hardware 
Hardware Verifica-
tion 
Rajesvari, 
M. 
et al 
2013 System-on-Chip (SoC) for Telecom-mand System Design Hardware Chip Design 
Krstic, S. 
et al 2014 
Security of SoC Firmware Load Proto-
col Firmware Firmware Protection 
Mentor n.d. 
Mentor Verification IP: Comprehen-
sive verification IP built using ad-
vanced methodologies for fastest time 
to verification sign-off 
Both Verification 
Ray, S. 
et al 2015 
Security policy enforcement in mod-
ern SoC designs Hardware Policies 
Backer, J. 
et al 2016 
Secure and Flexible Trace-Based De-
bugging of Systems-on-Chip Hardware/Firmware Debugging 
Ray, S. 
et al 2018 
System-on-Chip Platform Security 
Assurance: Architecture and Valida-
tion 
Both Design and Verifica-tion 
Wang, L. 
et al 2008 
System-on-ChipTest 
Architectures:Nanometer Design For 
Testability 
Hardware/Firmware Testing Hard-ware/Firmware 
` 
References Year Title Hardware/Software-
Firmware 
Specification 
Gundabolu, 
S. 
et al 
2018 
On-chip Data Security Against Un-
trustworthy Software and Hardware 
IPs in Embedded Systems 
Both Malicious IPs 
Elkeelany, 
O. 
et al 
2006 Gaining Extra Crypto-Security using System on Chip Model for RC5 Both Cryptography 
Backer, J. 
et al 2015 
Reusing The IEEE 1500 Design for Test 
Infrastructure For Security Monitoring 
of Systems-on-Chip 
Both Design and Architec-ture for Security 
Li, H. 
et al 2016 
A survey of hardware Trojan threat 
and defence Hardware Hardware Trojans 
ARM® 2019 Building a Secure System using Trust-Zone® Technology Hardware/Firmware Chip Design 
ACCELLERA 2011 Universal Verification Methodology (UVM) 1.1 User’s Guide Hardware/Firmware Verification 
Basak, A. 
et al 2015 
A Flexible Architecture for Systematic 
Implementation of SoC Security Poli-
cies 
Hardware/Firmware Architecture and Pol-icies 
 
7. Conclusion 
In conclusion it is very important for an SoC system in general to have security characteristics and to follow 
appropriate and correct standards and policies. It is always and has always been a good practice to follow glo-
bally accepted standards and define which policies to proceed with. The design process of security, and the 
decisions taken accordingly, highly depend on the imagination of the organisation. Some of the things may be 
obvious and underestimated or simply missed due to human factors.  
 
It is extremely important to secure microcontrollers and SoCs (whichever is used in the system) because they 
are the inevitable edge nodes of IoT (Kumar et al, 2017). By all means, protecting these chips mean protecting 
the whole system. 
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